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Ohio’s Collateral Source Rule and Robinson v. Bates

Especially for our personal injury clients, it is important for you to understand the significance of the Robinson v. Bates case.  In order to understand Robinson, you first must understand the Collateral Source Rule.

What is the Collateral Source Rule?

Suppose you are injured in an auto accident caused by the negligence (carelessness) of another driver.  You go to the emergency department, and incur $5,000 in medical expenses.  Your health insurance company pays $3,500, and the hospital accepts this as full payment of the bill (you owe the hospital nothing more).  (By the way, this happens all the time).  Remember, you will have to reimburse your health insurance company if you win at trial–this is called subrogation.

Now your case is before a jury, and you wish to be reimbursed for all of your losses.  Are you entitled to $5,000 or $3,500?  (We’re not addressing pain and suffering in this Post).

The collateral source rule implies that the injured party can recover $5,000 for his/her medical expenses, even though the hospital accepted $3,500 as payment in full.  When the medical expenses get very high, and the reimbursement is a small fraction of the bill, the differential can be significant.  Suppose, for example, that the medical bills are $100,000, and the Medicaid reimbursement is only $30,000.  Should the plaintiff recover $100,000 or $30,000?  That makes a significant difference in evaluating the case.

Robinson v. Bates

In Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, the Ohio Supreme Court decided to give the jury the original medical bill ($5,000), tell them the amount that was actually paid ($3,500), and then let the jury decide how much to award the plaintiff (as if a jury is better suited to decide this issue than simply imposing a fair rule of law).  Justice Lundberg Stratton wrote separately that the original bill should be given to the jury (to show the severity of the injury), but the plaintiff should only recover the actual amount paid ($3,500).

Old Rule:  Before Robinson, a plaintiff could generally recover the gross amount of his/her medical bills, regardless of whether the healthcare providers accepted a lesser amount as full payment.  The defendant could retain an expert to testify that a bill was unreasonably high, but could not introduce evidence that the provider accepted a lesser amount as full payment of the bill.  That was standard practice under the old collateral source rule.

Robinson v. Bates Rule:  Now we give the jury the medical bills, tell them how much of the bills were actually paid, and then let them decide how much is fair.

Comments

Let’s deal with reality:  Virtually all auto accidents that go to trial involve defendants who have automobile liability insurance.  The negligent driver (and his/her insurance company) is responsible for all damages s/he causes.  The plaintiff is entitled to all losses caused by the careless driver’s negligence.  The hospitals and doctors who treat the injured person should be entitled to recover the full fair market value of their services.  One could argue that the fair market value of the services provided by the doctors and hospitals is the negotiated amount paid by the health insurance company.  But since the automobile liability insurance company is ultimately paying the losses (not the health insurance company), the hospitals and doctors should recover the full fair market value of their services, not the negotiated rate paid by the health insurance.  The negotiated rate is fine for general health care (outside of the auto accident situation) because it is based on a large number of insured people who get better rates if they negotiate as a group.

Ask yourself this:  What is fair?  Pretty much everyone would agree the plaintiff should be held harmless, meaning s/he should not be “out-of-pocket” anything as a result of an accident that was not his/her fault.  In our hypothetical, the plaintiff is held harmless if s/he only recovers the $3,500.  Allowing the plaintiff to recovery $5,000 would be a windfall since the hospital agreed to accept $3,500 for its services.  Seems fair to me.  But I would allow the health care providers to recover the full fair market value of their services, instead of the negotiated amount.  The way it is now, the auto insurance companies are getting the advantage of rates negotiated by health insurance companies.

RC 2315.20

Note, RC 2315.20 (effective 4/7/05) changed the collateral source rule again (Robinson was based on Ohio law before the effective date of 2315.20).  Under RC 2315.20, the defendant may not introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff if the collateral source has a right of subrogation.  Almost all collateral sources these days have a right of subrogation, so the new rule says:  The defendant may not introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff.  This raises the question:  Under RC 2315.20, is the plaintiff entitled to the original amount of the medical bills, or the amount the providers accept as full payment?  This question will need to be answered by the courts.

Writeoffs

Doctors and hospitals often “write off” medical expenses for a variety of reasons (contractual, charitable, and otherwise).  But should the automobile liability company (who is liable for all medical expenses and other losses) get the benefit of a contractual, charitable, or accounting writeoff?  I think not.  Therefore, we encourage doctors and hospitals:  Do not write off any medical bill in the context of a motor vehicle accident or situation where a third party recovery is possible.

In Jaques v. Manton, 125 Ohio St.3d 342, 2010-Ohio-1838, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant may share with the jury the fact that a healthcare provider wrote off certain medical expenses.  The jury then can decide the fair market value of the medical services provided.  So, again, medical providers are encouraged not to write off invoices in the automobile accident context.

Jeffrey Beausay



Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute Upheld by Ohio Supreme Court

The Ohio Supreme Court has upheld the Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute, which was attacked on constitutional grounds.  The case is Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-546.

If a worker in Ohio is injured on the job due to the negligence of a third party (i.e. someone other than his/her employer), the worker has both a workers’ compensation claim, and a claim against the person who caused the injury.  If the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation pays benefits to the worker in the form of medical expenses and/or loss of income, the Bureau has a right of subrogation against both the party at fault and the injured worker. 

The bases for the constitutional challenge were fairly complicated and beyond the scope of this post.  Suffice it to say that the statute has been upheld, so the injured worker is strongly advised to retain a lawyer to help navigate the murky waters of this statute.

TJB’s Take:

The current workers’ compensation subrogation statute is actually the General Assembly’s third try at passing an essentially fair statute.  Two prior attempts failed in that the Ohio Supreme Court held them unconstitutional.  The current statute has the exact same flaws that the prior statutes had, but the current court did not recognize this, probably because they genuinely do not understand the new statute–it is fairly convoluted. 

Word to the wise:  Retain a trial lawyer if you find yourself in a position like this. 

Jeff Beausay, Trial Attorney 



Personal Injury Damages Caps Upheld by Ohio Supreme Court

In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly passed several “tort reform” measures, the most controversial being the limits on the amount a jury can award in personal injury and product liability cases.  See RC 2315.18.  Under the 2005 rules, a plaintiff cannot recover more than the greater of (1)$250,000 or (2) three times the economic damages up to a maximum of $350,000, or $500,000 per single occurrence.  These limits do not apply to catastrophic injuries, defined as ”permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system,” or “permanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform life-sustaining activities.”  These changes went into effect on April 7, 2005.

This statute was challenged on constitutional grounds.  In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, the Ohio Supreme Court held that this and other tort reform provisions do not violate the Ohio Constitution.

TJB’s BS:

Let’s not overreact.  These limits DO NOT apply to medical malpractice cases, wrongful death cases, or cases involving catastrophic injuries (as defined in the statute).  It would be unusual for a jury to award noneconomic damages (e.g. pain and suffering) in excess of $250,000 if the injury is not catastrophic.  So, in reality, this statute will not affect that many cases.

Also, bear in mind, the Ohio Supreme Court, as presently constituted, is a “strict constructionist” court, meaning that the Justices tend to uphold statutes passed by the General Assembly (Congress), unless the statute clearly violates the Ohio Constitution.  Therefore, if the people of Ohio strongly disagree with these tort reform measures, they need to elect different politicians who are more “plaintiff friendly.”

The more interesting constitutional question will arise in the medical malpractice context, where the damages caps have no exception for catastrophic injuries.

Jeffrey Beausay, Trial Lawyer



© Jeffrey Beausay
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