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Damages Caps Upheld Again (Political Subdivisions)

The $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in RC 2744.05(C)(1) does not violate the right to a jury trial or the right to equal protection under the law.  Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030.  The court followed its decision in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948. (See Post on Arbino).

The Constitution.  Article I Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution, and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution protect the right to a jury in civil cases.

Right to trial by jury.  The rationale is that juries decide facts, and the limitation on damages is a question of law. Thus, the statute does not infringe upon the jury’s role as fact-finder.

Equal Protection.  A statute is valid if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  The court held:  “The state has a valid interest in preserving the financial soundness of its political subdivisions.”   Also, since the State has the authority to prohibit all tort actions against political subdivisions, it is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable for the State to limit the amount that can be recovered against a political subdivision.      

Date of Decision:  1 Oct 2009

Majority: Moyer; Lundberg-Stratton; O’Connor; Lanzinger; Cupp

Dissent:  O’Donnell; Pfeifer

Jeffrey Beausay



Negligence of Minors

Can a person under the age of 18 be “negligent?”  Recall that negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care for the safety of others.  Well, the answer is:  it depends how old the minor is.  Infants under seven years of age are “incapable of negligence;” children between 7 and 14 are presumed to be incapable of negligence, but the presumption can be rebutted by showing that the child is of sufficient maturity and capacity to avoid danger and make intelligent judgments with regard to the activity in which s/he had engaged; children 14 and older are capable of negligence, but the issue must be determined by the jury. 

In Wheaton v. Conkle (1937), 57 Ohio App. 373, the court stated:

This proposition is supported by the case of Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St., 283, 20 N. E., 466, 3 L. R. A., 385, which has never been reversed and is now the law of this state, dealing with the degree of care required of children. On page 289 of the opinion it is stated:

“Children constitute a class of persons of less discretion and judgment than adults, of which all reasonably informed men are aware. Hence ordinarily prudent men, reasonably expect that children will exercise only the care and prudence of children, and no greater degree of care should be required of them than is usual under the circumstances, among careful and prudent persons of the class to which they belong.”

In the case of Fightmaster v. Mode, 31 Ohio App., 273, 167 N. E., 407, at page 281, we note the following:

“1. In the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence to children, in actions by them, or in their behalf, for injuries occasioned by the negligence of others, their conduct should not be judged by the same rule which governs that of adults; and while it is their duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid the injuries of which they complain, ordinary care for them, is that degree of care which children of the same age, of ordinary care and prudence, are accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances. * * *.

“Children are not chargeable with the same care as persons of mature years. Although children are required to exercise ordinary care to avoid the injuries of which they complain, such care, as applied to them, is that degree of care which children of the same age, education and experience, of ordinary care and prudence, are accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances.”

In Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Grambo, Sr., Admr., 103 Ohio St., 471, 134 N. E., 648, 20 A. L. R., 1214, at page 476, it is held:

“The standard governing such negligence on the part of a youth is not the same as that of an adult.”

This request, when carefully read, does not say that Section 6310-36, General Code, had no application to Anson Wheaton, aged fifteen. It does say that in the jury’s determination of any violation of the section by him that he is only required to exercise such care as one of his age, of ordinary care and prudence, is accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances.

Some other cases on point are:

  • Foulke v. Beogher (2006), 166 Ohio App.3d 435, 2006-Ohio-1411
  • Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan (1889), 46 Ohio St. 283 
  • Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co. v. Mackey (1895), 53 Ohio St. 370
  • Holbrock v. Hamilton Distributing, Inc. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 185

Jeffrey Beausay  



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