The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 articles written by James Madison (29 articles), John Jay (5 articles), and Alexander Hamilton (51 articles) advocating passage of the Constitution. Many (including the Anti-Federalists) thought the Constitution gave too much power to the federal government, and thus were against its passage. The Federalists and others supported the Constitution, cautioning that the enumerated powers would keep the federal government in check. Some of the more influential articles are summarized below.
Federalist No. 40
In Federalist No. 40, James Madison sets forth the authority of the Constitutional Convention to propose the new Constitution. As with many of the Federalist Papers, No. 40 is difficult to understand, especially with an initial, casual review. In summary, the representatives of the Convention were trying to improve upon the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation were deemed “feeble and confined.”
Federalist No. 41
In Federalist No. 41, Madison separated federal power into 6 categories:
- Security against foreign danger (Federalist No. 41)
- Intercourse with foreign nations (Federalist No. 42)
- Intercourse among the States (Federalist No. 42)
- Miscellaneous powers (Federalist No. 43)
- Restrictions on the Authority of the States (Federalist No. 44)
- Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers
I. Security Against Foreign Danger (Federalist No. 41)
- The power to declare war
- Providing Armies and Fleets
- Regulating and calling forth the Militia
- Taxing and Borrowing Money
Note that the power to tax and borrow falls under Class I, which confers powers to protect against foreign dangers. The power to tax and borrow was originally intended primarily to fund the military, i.e. mostly a means of protecting against foreign dangers. It is important to bear in mind that the role of the federal government was intentionally restricted primarily to foreign affairs — domestic issues being left to the States. The power to tax and borrow (among others) has now ballooned into all manner of public projects.
Federalist No. 45
In Federalist No. 45, James Madison tries to reassure the detractors of the Constitution that the powers given to the Federal goverment under the Constitution will not subsume the powers retained by the States. Madison says essentially: Don’t worry about the powers given to the federal government; for many reasons, the federal government should not become too powerful. These reasons include:
- Some federal power is necessary (e.g., to protect the citizens from foreign powers; to quell disputes between States, etc.).
- State employees and representatives will simply outnumber Federal employees.
- And perhaps most importantly:
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States.”
Federalist No. 46 (The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared)
In Federalist No. 46, James Madison explains that State governments should, as a matter of course, trump the Federal Government. Even in the event of a military confrontation, the sheer numbers would favor the State governments. 46 is sometimes cited as a basis for gun ownership rights. In it, Madison assumes that a regular army could not, as a practical matter, exceed 1/100 of the population or 1/25 of able-bodied citizens; whereas a militia would be 20 times that number. ”Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate [State] governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.”
The fundamental principle of our constitution is repeated: The constitution is a balance between reserving power and rights to the states, while enabling the federal government to do those specific things that the states cannot do (or do as well) as the central government. For the reasons stated in Federalist No. 46, Madison tried to allay the anxiety about the federal government assuming too much power.
Federalist No. 51
In Federalist No. 51, Madison stresses the importance of the separation of powers in the Constitution. This separation protects against excessive power in any one branch. “In republican government, the legislative authority [Congress] necessarily predominates.” Congress is therefore divided into 2 parts, each a check on the other. The President has less power, and therefore is given a veto, which can be overridden by a 2/3 vote of both houses.
There are a few gems in Federalist 51:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. ***
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.
