In Federalist No. 10, James Madison addresses the dangers of “faction,” defined as groups adverse to the rights of others or to the interests of the nation as a whole. We call them political parties, and at present there are essentially two (Democrats and Republicans). Even in the early years of the nation under our present Constitution, there were usually two competing parties; early on it was the Federalists and Republicans, the Federalists favoring larger, more energized government; Republicans favoring more limited government. And they usually hate each other.
Madison himself would have been considered a Federalist at the inception of the Constitution; indeed, the Federalist Papers (written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay) were written to advocate passage of the Constitution. However, very soon after passage (even during Washington’s presidency), Hamilton (Secretary of Treasury under Washington) and those of his ilk advocated a much more energized federal government than Madison, Jefferson, and others. Madison and Jefferson favored a strict construction of the Constitution; if the Constitution did not specifically authorize the federal government to do something, it was forbidden and the States were not bound by any act of the federal government not authorized in the Constitution.
Getting back to Federalist No. 10, Madison was keenly cognizant of the dangers of parties. Like Jefferson, Madison believed passionately in liberty, especially liberty of the mind.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
As to taxes, Madison said:
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
Madison was more concerned about the will of the majority than a minority. If a minority imposes its will on the majority, free elections should resolve that problem. But when a majority imposes on the rights of a minority, elections cannot correct the injustice.
Madison’s conclusion is that the causes of faction cannot be removed. Therefore, the best we can do is to control its effects. How do we do that? By limiting the power of the federal government to “the great and aggregate interests;” the State legislatures to address matters “local and particular.” And this is why it is so important that we restrain the federal government to those “great and aggregate” subjects in the Constitution.
Jeffrey Beausay (5 Nov 2010)






